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ABSTRACT 
This thesis asks the question: How to make states implement norms as 
they were intended upon the creation of a treaty? It uses Saudi Arabia and the 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) as a case study, taking the period from 2000-2015 as its focus. It 
uses the spiral model by Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (2013) and the criticisms by 
Krook and True (2010) on diverging norm interpretations to analyse yearly 
human rights reports. Several conclusions can be drawn. It has become 
apparent that several of Saudi Arabia’s characteristics have a big influence on 
the use of the social mechanisms described in the spiral model. Due to its 
material strength, actors “from above” refrain from using any pressure 
mechanisms to criticize Saudi Arabia on its women’s rights situation. 
Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s autocratic regime results in citizens not having the 
power to stand up to their government, meaning there is no pressure “from 
below”. On top of that gets Saudi Arabia no criticism from states in the region 
nor from its key partner – the United States – because either those states do not 
have a better situation on women’s rights or they have not ratified CEDAW 
themselves, making them to be in no position to criticize Saudi Arabia. Even 
when Saudi Arabia is participating with legal mechanisms to improve 
compliance with CEDAW through submitting reports to the Committee of 
CEDAW and allowing the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women to do 
research, compliance is not necessarily improved, as those institutions lack the 
enforcement mechanisms to make states implement recommendations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When Saudi Arabia ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), it added the following reservation: “In 
case of contradiction between any term of the Convention and the norms of 
Islamic law, the Kingdom is not under obligation to observe the contradictory 
terms of the Convention” (United Nations, n.d.). With its human rights record in 
mind, it can be questioned why Saudi Arabia would ratify a treaty when it is not 
truly willing to commit. Literature on why repressive states ratify (human rights) 
treaties point at several incentives. Most importantly, ratifying a treaty is seen 
as relatively low-cost and will reward a state with high benefits in the 
international community (Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui & Meyer, 2008, p. 116). As a 
result, Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2007, p. 407) argue that human rights 
treaties are failing where they are most needed, and find that “socialization, 
persuasion, and learning, if they are taking place over time, are not teaching 
the rights messages to the governments that need the most help” (2007, p. 
423) with implementing human rights norms. They thus argue it is very hard, if 
not impossible, to push repressive regimes into compliance. Krook and True 
(2010, p. 108) have a different explanation, as they argue that states have 
different interpretations of the norms created with CEDAW, as can be seen 
through the use of reservations in the treaty.  
This points to an interesting problem, which is what this thesis will 
research. It will ask: how to make states implement the norms as they were 
intended upon the creation of the treaty? It will take Saudi Arabia and CEDAW 
as a case study, as Saudi Arabia can be seen as an extreme case of human 
rights violation. The thesis will make use of the spiral model by Risse, Ropp and 
Sikkink (2013) to find solutions for Saudi Arabia’s implementation problem. 
Additionally, it will use Krook and True’s (2010) theory of diverging norm 
interpretations. The spiral model of Risse, Ropp, and Sikking (2013, p. 17) 
suggests that Saudi Arabia’s characteristics make it hard to push it to 
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compliance of the treaty; however, the spiral model does suggest certain 
mechanisms that can make Saudi Arabia implement the norms as intended 
with the treaty. Krook and True’s (2010) norm interpretations-argument may 
add options to push Saudi Arabia to compliance. 
Finding an answer to the implementation problem explored in this thesis 
is relevant for theoretical development. It will add not only to the academic 
discussion on reservations and treaties, but also to international norm theory 
and repressive regimes and human rights treaties, as this thesis concerns a 
non-Western, extreme case of norm-violation regarding human (and specifically 
women’s) rights. Additionally, the results of this thesis will have an important 
societal relevance, as they will help to understand how human rights norms can 
be better implemented, even in extreme cases of violation. This is beneficial for 
people not only in Saudi Arabia, but also in other rights-violating states, as 
lessons can be taken from this case and exported to others. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review will firstly describe existing literature that focuses 
on repressive states and human rights treaties, after which literature on 
reservations and human rights treaties will be discussed. It will then look at 
models of international norms and explore the concept of compliance. 
Repressive States and Human Rights Treaties 
Several scholars have created theories on why repressive states sign 
human rights treaties, even when they have no interest in committing to them. 
Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui and Meyer (2008, p. 116) argue that because of the 
importance that is given to human rights in the international community, rights-
violating governments have opportunities to “display low-cost legitimating 
commitments to world norms” without necessarily being willing or enabled to 
comply with the commitments made. Additionally, they argue that repressive 
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regimes are more likely to ratify human rights treaties when they control the 
domestic powers that have to execute the human rights treaties (2008, p. 116). 
As a result, human rights treaty ratification is the ultimate response for 
repressive states to criticism from the international community, with relatively 
low costs. Simmons (2009, 57) classifies these types of states as strategic 
ratifiers. These types of states ratify a treaty only because they want to avoid 
criticism. Mostly they ratify because states in the region have ratified and they 
do not want to stand out from the rest, which Simmons calls “social 
camouflage” (2009, p. 88). 
As a result of this strategic ratification, the effect of having ratified a 
human rights treaty in these states is often low. As argued by Hafner-Burton 
and Tsutsui (2007, p. 407), this is problematic, as human rights treaties seem to 
fail exactly where they are needed the most. They find that reforms of the 
institutions will not offer much help, as “deeper delegation of legal authority to 
the international regime does not make reforms much more likely, even over 
time” (2007, p. 410) and argue that the problem lies with repressive regimes 
either having no capacity to commit or failing to learn the essentiality of human 
rights protection. They thus have a rather pessimistic view of the human rights 
treaties, and argue that they are not teaching the right messages to the 
repressive governments – they do not teach the importance of human rights 
protection as these type of governments apparently do not change their 
behaviour. However, Hill (2010) critiques this view and argues that there are 
different effects of different treaties. Interestingly, he finds that ratification of 
CEDAW has had a “positive, statistically significant impact on observance of at 
least one type of women’s rights” (2010, p. 1171), namely political rights. This 
thus means that states that have ratified CEDAW have provided women with 
political rights more so than states that have not ratified the treaty. 
Interestingly, these theories do not take the concept of reservations into 
account, which consequences are highly debated. Reservations, as well as 
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understandings and declarations (combined shortened as RUDs), can be 
added to ratifications of human rights treaties. These RUDs allow a state to alter 
the conditions to which the treaty applies and thus to what extent the state has 
to comply with the treaty. A reservation limits the effects of the treaty on 
domestic legislation. Scholars have varying viewpoints on the legitimacy of 
RUDs, which can be divided into two perspectives.  
The first perspective views RUDs as “a legitimate means to account for 
diversity across countries” (Neumayer, 2007, p. 397). Using RUDs signals a 
state taking human rights seriously, as it deliberately signs and thinks about the 
consequences of signing, and to what extent it believes it is capable of 
complying. The RUD is used to indicate where the state believes it is not 
capable of complying. Neumayer (2007, p. 397) found that as liberal 
democracies have placed more reservations on human rights treaties 
compared to states with other types of government, this positive view of RUDs 
best explains the use of them. Another positive side of RUDs is that they allow 
for more inclusion and cultural diversity. More states will be willing to sign a 
treaty if they can modify it somewhat to match their (cultural) beliefs. As a 
result, more states participate in the treaty, which, no matter how slowly or 
minimally, improves the human rights situation for more people all over the 
world. Especially for states that are likely to violate human rights, this 
perspective argues it would be better to include them, as then the situation can 
be improved with legal means. 
The second perspective on RUDs regard this argument of inclusion as 
one of the biggest negative sides of RUDs, as the meaning and depth of the 
concerned treaty is diminished when practically everyone can join. These 
critics of RUDs believe that RUDs go against the universality of human rights, 
and allow for states to “avoid international legal obligations where they would 
be consequential” (Hill, 2016, p. 1129). Especially since human rights treaties 
concern norms and morals, this perspective argues that much of its appeal is 
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lost when states may opt out of legislature that should be universally applicable 
(Neumayer, 2007, p. 407). Contrary to Neumayer’s (2007) findings mentioned 
before, Hill (2016, p. 1129) found that governments will most likely enter 
reservations when their legal standards are lax compared to the legal 
standards of the treaty. He thus sees that by adding reservations to their 
ratification of human rights treaties, states are simply avoiding legal 
commitments. Additionally, Lijnzaad (1995, p. 112) sees reservations also as 
problematic, as they may harm the people under the state’s jurisdiction while 
these people do not have the power to equally harm their state. Citizens cannot 
make a reciprocal restriction on their obligations toward the state if that state 
fails to abide to its obligations towards them. Reservations are thus seen as a 
way for states to commit to treaties with a relatively low effect and cost; upon 
ratification states can choose to what extent they are willing to comply. 
These descriptive theories pose multiple problems of human rights 
treaties and especially of repressive states joining them. They however do not 
provide any solutions on how to make repressive states improve their human 
rights situation and make them comply with the treaties they have signed in the 
way that was intended upon creating the treaty. The classification of being a 
strategic ratifier explains the characteristics of the state and perhaps the 
underlying processes of ratification, however it does not provide a pathway of 
how to improve the situation. Moreover, since the ratification process of human 
rights treaties has not changed to incorporate these criticisms, it appears the 
United Nations and/or the international community does not believe these 
criticisms to be valid enough to alter processes. The question how to make 
states implement norms as they were intended will thus have to be answered 
through a different field of theory. This is why there will be looked into 
international norm theory to find how norms like human rights norms can be 
fully implemented by states. 
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International Norm Theory 
Several scholars have described models that develop stages of a norm’s 
“life cycle” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 895). For example, the cascade 
model by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) sees a norm passing three phases 
before internalization. The first phase is norm emergence, whereby norm 
entrepreneurs use persuasion to get others attached to the norm. Then, a norm 
cascade takes place, whereby actors imitate each other with the result of broad 
norm acceptance. In the last stage the norm is internalized. This cascade 
model is quite simplistic, and does not at all incorporate strategic ratification as 
identified by Hafner-Burton et al. (2008) and Simmons (2009). The spiral model 
by Risse, Ropp & Sikkink (1999; 2013) is somewhat more comprehensive and 
describes processes more specifically, as it describes five distinct phases in 
which human rights norms are internalized. The five phases are: (1) repression, 
(2) denial, (3) tactical concessions, (4) prescriptive status, and (5) rule 
consistent behaviour (2013, p. 6-7). In this model, states internalize human 
rights norms after they have made strategic concessions in order to satisfy the 
criticising international community. This model thus does acknowledge 
strategic ratification. Important in this model is international pressure, but also 
domestic movements, which together apply pressure to the government both 
from below and from above to make the state adhere to the norm. 
Critics of these type of models argue that norms are treated as being 
static instead of dynamic, and do not include the complex processes that exist 
to make norms adoption and translation into practice possible (Krook & True, 
2010, p. 104). Krook and True (2010, p. 109) argue that norms are “subject to 
ongoing attempts to reconstitute their meanings”, meaning that throughout the 
process of implementation, the meaning and consequences of a norm are 
discussed and thereby sometimes even altered. As a result, different 
interpretations of norms might exist simultaneously. Additionally, it is argued 
that models such as the spiral model treat norm implementation as a linear 
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process, and do not allow for situations where states get stuck in progress or 
go backwards in the model, for example from phase 4 to 3 (Krook & True, 
2010, p. 104). As an alternative approach to the constructivist models 
described above, Krook and True (2010, p. 105) propose a discursive 
approach, where they introduce an adaptation of the existing models. They 
argue for allowing for backlash and dynamics within the models instead of only 
allowing for a norm to progress to the next phase (Krook & True, 2010, p. 123). 
They also note the importance of non-governmental organisations such as the 
World Bank and the International Labour Organisation (2010, p. 116) for the 
implementation of norms, specifically for women’s rights. 
Interestingly, Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (2013, p. 4) have also criticised 
their own spiral model when they revisited the model fifteen years after 
publication. They recognized several weaknesses in their original work, for 
example presuming states to be fully functioning instead of allowing for “limited 
statehood”, and at the same time not looking into norm violations by powerful 
states or core defenders of human rights norms, such as the United States in 
the case of the ‘War on Terror’ when it allowed for torturing suspects of 
terrorism by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Risse & Ropp, 2013, p. 7-9). 
They therefore seek to clarify the scope conditions and concepts to be used in 
the revisited spiral model. Most importantly, they expand the theory so that it 
allows for attention to situations where states fail to progress in the model or 
experience backlash, which was one of the before-mentioned 
recommendations by Krook and True (Risse & Ropp, 2013, p. 12). These 
extensions and additions to the model make the spiral model more applicable 
in present-day situations, and make it a model that applies to a grand variety of 
states and situations, helping to assess the situation at hand. With the additions 
and clarifications, the new spiral model thus meets the recommendations on 
the inclusion of a non-linear progress that were made by Krook and True 
(2010). Nevertheless, the different interpretations of norms that can exist due to 
Karen van der Ploeg 
 8 
reservations are not included in the new model. This is important for the case of 
Saudi Arabia and CEDAW, as through its reservation, Saudi Arabia has 
implemented another interpretation of the norms in CEDAW than perhaps was 
originally intended. 
So where are we standing? The spiral model offers a comprehensive 
framework for norm implementation through its five phases. The updated 
version (2013) also provides insight in a pathway for states that experience 
backlash or get stuck halfway through the model, and can thus be helpful in the 
case of Saudi Arabia and CEDAW. However, some concepts are not yet 
included in the new version. Most importantly, it does not grasp the possibility 
of multiple interpretations of the same norm as was argued by Krook and True 
(2010). Reservations on a treaty allow a state to alter the interpretation of that 
treaty, as is the case with Saudi Arabia and CEDAW. Saudi Arabia thus might 
believe it has fully implemented women’s rights to the extent that it deems 
possible – it has implemented its own interpretation of women’s rights norms – 
whereas many other states disagree because they have a different 
interpretation of the same norm. In order to find solutions on how to push Saudi 
Arabia to compliance, the spiral model is incomplete, as one will also have to 
think about the different interpretations that might exist and whether or not to 
make those differences disappear. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Following the literature review is Saudi Arabia a strategic ratifier of 
CEDAW, as it ratified the treaty for strategic reasons rather than being willing to 
commit. Nevertheless, in line with the spiral model, there are movements visible 
that slightly improve the position of women in Saudi Arabian society (Pearson, 
2015, December 12). The spiral model will be used in order to find an answer 
to the research question: ‘How to make states implement norms as they were 
intended upon the creation of a treaty?’ The theoretical framework provided by 
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this model will be complemented with Krook and True’s (2010) 
recommendations. Firstly two main concepts that are used in this thesis, 
namely ‘norms’ and ‘compliance’, will be defined. Then, the spiral model will be 
further explained and described, after which it will be linked to Saudi Arabia. 
Definition of Concepts 
In order to research how norms are implemented, firstly, the definition of 
a norm will have to be discussed. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 891) 
identified a definition of norms as “shared assessments” (1998, p. 892), or 
“agreement among a critical mass of actors” (1998, p. 892). This is still not very 
specific, as it is not defined when a mass is ‘critical’, which is why this thesis 
uses the definition of Krook and True, which states that norms are “values, 
principles and procedures that are widespread and institutionalized” (2010, p. 
106). 
Compliance is defined by Risse and Ropp (2013, p. 9) as “sustained 
behaviour and domestic practices that conform to the international human 
rights norms, or … rule-consistent behaviour”. They see compliance as the end 
of a continuum that starts with commitment (which they define as actors 
accepting human rights as valid and binding (2013, p. 9)). Notion should be 
made here of Krook and True’s (2010) perspective on diverging interpretations 
of norms. Compliance can mean something different for different states. 
Compliance in the case of Saudi Arabia and CEDAW thus needs a stricter 
definition than the one Risse and Sikkink use. This thesis will therefore slightly 
adjust their definition, and defines compliance (of specifically CEDAW) as 
sustained behaviour and domestic practices that conform to and are in the 
same spirit as the international human rights norms as described and intended 
by CEDAW. With this definition, culturally different interpretations through 
reservations are not necessarily accepted as compliance; compliance will 
mean true implementation of the norms as they were originally intended with 
CEDAW. 
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The Spiral Model 
As described by Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999, p. 22-38; 2013, p. 6-9), 
the spiral model consists of five separate phases that a norm travels through 
before it is fully implemented. Through international and domestic pressures, 
states can be pushed from commitment to compliance, through the five phases 
of repression, denial, tactical concessions, prescriptive status, and rule 
consistent behaviour. Saudi Arabia is currently situated in the third phase of the 
model, that of tactical concessions (Alhargan, 2012, p. 611). In their revisit of 
the model, Risse and Ropp (2013, p. 13) identify several mechanisms 
important for compliance, namely coercion, incentive structures, persuasion 
and discourse, and capacity building. These mechanisms work next to the 
mechanisms identified in the first version of the model, existing of instrumental 
adaptation, argumentation and habitualization. Through these social 
mechanisms international and domestic actors can alter state behaviour. 
Next to these mechanisms that push states into compliance, Risse and 
Ropp (2013), identify five scope conditions that evaluate the impact of these 
mechanisms on human rights change. For Saudi Arabia, these scope 
conditions thus make the social mechanisms have different effects on bringing 
about change. Firstly, Saudi Arabia is an autocratic state. As a result, 
persuasion will be more difficult to work because the state will not have an 
“institutionalized logic of appropriateness” (Risse & Ropp, 2013, p. 17). Risse 
and Ropp argue that incentives like sanctions and rewards may be more 
effective in the case of Saudi Arabia than for democratic regimes, as autocratic 
regimes cannot be shamed into compliance. The second scope condition of 
consolidated capacity can be seen as a positive characteristic, as Saudi 
Arabia thus possesses the capacity to actually implement human rights norms. 
As a result, Risse and Ropp (2013, p. 18) argue that coercion/legal 
enforcement, positive and negative incentives, and persuasion/shaming are 
expected to be applicable to Saudi Arabia.  
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Thirdly, Saudi Arabia has centralized rule implementation, which is 
argued to make compliance more likely than for decentralized rule. Because 
public authorities are carrying out the norm, it is easier to monitor than when for 
example rebel groups are defying the norms. However, for gender rights this is 
not necessarily true, as non-state actors are expected to comply with gender 
rights norms – not state actors. Nevertheless, it is expected that coercion, 
incentives and persuasion can all bring about effects on compliance.  Fourth, 
Saudi Arabia is not materially vulnerable due to its oil export, which makes the 
state “less vulnerable to external economic or military pressures than are weak 
actors” (Risse & Ropp, 2013, p. 20). It will thus be difficult for the international 
community to find measures that target Saudi Arabia but that do not hurt 
themselves. Lastly, Saudi Arabia is considered to be socially vulnerable to a 
certain extent. On the one hand, it is powerful – and thus less vulnerable – 
because it has played an important regional and international role, in for 
example the Gulf Cooperation Council, the League of Arab States, and the 
United Nations (Alhargan, 2012, p. 599). On the other hand, if states from these 
organisations rally against Saudi Arabia, it might alter its behaviour for fear of 
losing its powerful position.  
Because of its pride in Islamic law, it can be difficult for non-Islamic 
states to persuade Saudi Arabia on its position on women’s rights, as Saudi 
Arabia might base its arguments on cultural differences and different norm 
interpretations. When Islamic states with similar norm interpretations try to 
persuade Saudi Arabia, this might be different. Looking at Krook and True’s 
(2010) argument on differences in norm interpretations, it can thus be expected 
that a difference in norm interpretation will interfere with the effectiveness of the 
mechanisms described above. When the differences in norm interpretation 
between states are resolved, the mechanisms described above will have 
greater success in pushing Saudi Arabia to compliance, or are perhaps not 
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even necessary because of Saudi Arabia’s understanding of the importance of 
women’s rights. 
 
H1: The more social mechanisms are used that are in line with Saudi 
Arabia’s scope conditions, the more Saudi Arabia will be pushed to 
compliance. 
 
H2: Actors with a similar norm interpretation of CEDAW as Saudi 
Arabia have a bigger effect on pushing Saudi Arabia to compliance 
than actors with a different norm interpretation. 
 
METHODS 
Case selection 
Saudi Arabia is chosen as a case study for this research. The time 
period of research is from 2000 until 2015, as 2000 is the time when Saudi 
Arabia entered its current phase of the spiral model (phase three) according to 
Alhargan (2012, p. 611). Saudi Arabia is seen as one of the most repressive 
states in the world, often violating human rights (Amnesty International, n.d.). 
Domestic activism or protest will be suppressed immediately, as can be seen 
by the imprisonment of many human rights activists (Amnesty International, 
n.d.). It will thus be hard for domestic activists to truly make a difference in 
national policies. Additionally, because of its material and social strength, it will 
be very hard to persuade Saudi Arabia to comply through international 
pressure. Nevertheless, there are indications that times are changing, as can 
be seen in women being allowed to vote for the first time in 2015, or for 
example the ‘Women2Drive’ protests that ask for women to be allowed to drive. 
Saudi Arabia is the only country in the world that does not allow women to drive 
vehicles. Saudi Arabia is the only country in the world that does not allow 
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women to drive vehicles. Saudi Arabia thus serves as an excellent case in this 
study, because it is a non-Western state and an extreme case of norm-violation 
regarding human (and specifically women’s) rights. If Saudi Arabia can be 
made to comply, less repressive or autocratic regimes might be made to 
comply as well.  
Additionally, women’s rights are chosen as the focus of this study. Saudi 
Arabia has one of the worst situations regarding women’s rights in the world 
because of its guardianship system. Women cannot move freely without the 
consent of a man – they need their legal guardian to allow them to travel or go 
to school. The Women’s Convention as a treaty is an interesting treaty to 
research since it is one of the most ratified human rights treaty of all human 
rights treaties of the United Nations – it currently has 189 parties and 99 
signatories (Krook & True, 2010, p. 112; UN Treaty Collection, n.d.). 
Nevertheless, it is also the treaty that has the most reservations by member 
states (Krook & True, 2010, p. 112). As a result of the many reservations, 
gender equality as a norm will be interpreted in many different ways 
internationally and domestically (Krook & True, 2010, p. 112). As a norm, it is 
thus contested greatly, and researching how to implement a more 
comprehensive interpretation of the norms in a state with a very limited 
interpretation of those norms may also serve as an example for other norms. 
Important to note is that ‘women’s rights’ still is a very broad concept. It is 
chosen to look at women’s rights in Saudi Arabia as a whole, including the legal 
guardianship system, domestic violence and access to the labour market, 
mostly because the few and small steps Saudi Arabia has taken over the years 
are more insightful to look at altogether rather than picking out a few. This way, 
the situation as a whole will be evaluated rather than only a single part. 
Data Collection 
This thesis searches for mechanisms that push Saudi Arabia to 
compliance of CEDAW. In order to find these mechanisms, reports by Amnesty 
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International, Human Rights Watch and the United States’ State Department will 
be used. These three organisations provide yearly reports on the status of 
human rights, resulting in a complete overview of the human rights situation in 
Saudi Arabia and the changes that take place over the years. These reports will 
be analysed from 2000 onwards, as this was the year Saudi Arabia ratified 
CEDAW, and entered the third phase of the spiral model as was argued by 
Alhargan (2010, p. 112).  
Through these reports, pushes both from above and from below will 
become visible. ‘Actors from above’ will entail actors from the international 
community, which can be both states and international organisations such as 
the European Union, the United Nations or the League of Arab States. ‘From 
below’ will contain actors from the domestic society and nongovernmental 
organisations that do local or transnational work to improve the human rights 
situation in Saudi Arabia. Nongovernmental organisations of interest in this 
case are Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the local women’s 
rights organisation Musawah, which is a regional organisation focusing 
specifically on women’s rights in Muslim societies. 
The data that is collected for this thesis thus consists of qualitative data, 
as the processes at stake are being analysed. Quantitative data will not provide 
the depth and insight that this thesis is looking for. The mechanisms at work to 
push Saudi Arabia to compliance have to be identified, which is the type of 
information provided by qualitative data. 
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The reports by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the US 
State Department provide a rather depressing view of Saudi Arabia’s human 
rights record. The sentence that is repeated in every single report in one way or 
another comes down to “women continued to face severe discrimination” 
(Amnesty International, 2001, p. 206), or, “authorities continued to discriminate 
against women” (Human Rights Watch, 2016, p. 484). Human rights defenders 
and activists also continued to be prosecuted for exercising their right to 
freedom of expression, minors continued to be sentenced to death, people 
remained to be sentenced after being tortured for confession. Reading the 
reports, it is understandable why Amnesty International sees Saudi Arabia as 
the state with one of the worst human rights record in the world. 
This section will firstly describe the developments made in Saudi Arabia 
regarding women’s rights since 2000. Then the pressures from above and 
below will be discussed. After this, an analysis of the use of social mechanisms 
as described in the spiral model will be made. 
Developing Women’s Rights in Saudi Arabia 
The year 2000 came with an “unprecedented move” (Amnesty 
International, 2001, p. 206) from the Saudi Arabian government, as the Deputy 
Foreign Minister stated that “human rights are a non-negotiable objective for 
the achievement of which we must all strive together” (Amnesty International, 
2001, p. 206), signalling the belief in the universality and the importance of 
human rights. This belief was strengthened by Saudi Arabia ratifying the 
Women’s Convention. However, upon ratifying, the state did make a significant 
reservation, which stated “In case of contradiction between any term of the 
Convention and the norms of Islamic law, the Kingdom is not under obligation 
to observe the contradictory terms of the Convention” (United Nations, n.d.). As 
a result, the terms under which the Convention applies to Saudi Arabia have 
become quite vague – it is not specified which articles or norms in the 
Convention contradict Islamic Law. This paradox – signing but being vague 
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about the extent of the consequences – somewhat reflects the overall sentiment 
of Saudi Arabian policy regarding women’s rights over the years. The 
government made a lot of hopeful promises, but in the end, it has often failed to 
eventually execute them, or only executed parts of its promises. When the head 
of state changed in 2005 and 2015 after the decease of the previous King, it 
gave some hope for political reform, but the respective new leaders did not 
(yet) live up to those expectations. 
However, some positive developments can be noted. The Saudi 
government started to issue personal identity cards to women, which 
contributed to the government eventually allowing women to vote in 2015, after 
they were excluded from voting in the first-ever elections in the country in 2005 
and the follow-up elections in 2011. Women thus now have the same political 
rights as men, meaning that they are allowed to vote and stand as candidates 
in the municipal elections – which are the only elections being held in Saudi 
Arabia. The public’s vote accounts for filling up two-thirds of the Municipal 
Council, the rest of the members are appointed by the King. In 2015, fourteen 
per cent of the candidates were women, and 21 seats of the 2,106 seats 
available for elected members were eventually appointed to women. 
Additionally, since 2007, women have been appointed to the Shura Council, 
which is the Consultative Council of the King; they now take up at least 20 per 
cent of the Council. 
Other rights that have seen some improvement include economic rights, 
with women being more allowed to work. However, employment is still low in 
2016, which might result from the strict conditions under which a woman is 
allowed to work. The Ministry of Labour stated that women may only work with 
consideration of “the need of the woman for work, the need of the society for 
her work, the approval of her legal guardian … and that [it] should not be at the 
expense of her family life” (Amnesty International, 2006, p. 221). Dress codes 
should also be respected, and the work should not lead to social or moral 
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problems. Additionally to these restrictions are women still not allowed to drive, 
despite protest throughout the country with the Women2Drive campaign. Not 
only is this a great limitation to women’s personal freedom, it is also hindering 
their access to the labour market, as women now need expensive drivers to 
bring them to their work. As a result, being able to work is still a privilege for 
women from the wealthier families that can afford to pay a driver. Nevertheless, 
due to low oil prices and budget cuts by the government, the new generation 
has to pull hard on the economy, and it is estimated that the number of women 
in employment is rising fast (NOS op 3, 2016, March 13). 
In sum, the situation for women in Saudi Arabia has changed somewhat, 
mostly with regards to their political and economic rights. Nevertheless, the 
guardianship system is still intact, meaning women still do not enjoy personal 
freedom and the freedom to make their own decisions. One can see Saudi 
Arabia thus has not implemented the women’s rights norms as they were 
intended in CEDAW. So what has been done in the time of research to 
influence Saudi Arabia’s women’s rights situation? This will be discussed in the 
next two sections. 
Pressures from Above 
Bilateral Pressures 
Disappointingly, there are not many moves by the international 
community visible in the reports. Saudi Arabia is not being held accountable for 
its violations of human rights or women’s rights. Human Rights Watch states 
year after year that key partners of Saudi Arabia fail to discuss its human rights 
record when meeting with governments officials. Some events in Saudi Arabia 
were discussed internationally, but these did not include women’s rights. 
Additionally, when meetings between governments took place, human rights 
were not often part of the conversation, and if this were the case, it usually 
addressed corporal punishment of convicts, for example with the case of 
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blogger Raif Badawi who was sentenced to 1000 lashes for criticizing the 
government. Especially for women’s rights, the international community 
appeared to steer away from the issue, relying on Saudi Arabia as a business 
partner and trying not to harm the relationship. 
Unfortunately, Saudi Arabia’s human rights cannot count on much 
support from key partners of Saudi Arabia. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the 
United States is seen as the biggest partner. Regrettably, despite the United 
States signing CEDAW in 1980, it has never ratified the convention. As a result, 
the United States is in no position to criticize Saudi Arabia on its failure to 
implement CEDAW, which is why it will not likely do so. Since 2010, the other 
key partner of Saudi Arabia, as seen by Human Rights Watch, has been the 
United Kingdom. It can be argued the United Kingdom has missed the 
opportunity to use its powerful position to try to influence Saudi Arabia on its 
human rights record. Instead, it has focused on the economic benefits of 
remaining partners with Saudi Arabia. 
Additionally, states within the region are also highly unlikely to criticize 
Saudi Arabia on its human rights and especially women’s rights situation. Even 
though Saudi Arabia’s women’s rights situation might be considered the worst, 
the states in the region also do not have a particularly outstanding women’s 
rights situation. If those states’ own women’s rights situation is not developed, 
they are not in the position to criticize another states’ situation. Moreover, on 
December 23, 2013, a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) joint security 
agreement came into force, which included an article that suppressed 
interference in domestic affairs of other GCC countries (Human Rights Watch, 
2015, p. 465). As a result, criticism by other Gulf Cooperation Council Members 
is criminalized, and will therefore most likely not happen. 
The only case where a Muslim country criticized Saudi Arabia was in the 
case of Indonesia. In 2015, the President of Indonesia voiced its concern for 
the Indonesian domestic workers in Saudi Arabia, who lacked protection. 
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Especially women foreign domestic workers were at risk of abuses like sexual 
or physical violence. When the abuse was reported, often the abused workers 
were at risk of being prosecuted themselves for indecency or other accusations 
by their employers. In 2015, Indonesia sought to end migration by Indonesian 
women for domestic work; however, this was deemed unobtainable and was 
never executed. 
Multilateral Pressures 
In 2007, Saudi Arabia submitted its first report to the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and it appeared before 
the committee in January 2008 (Amnesty International, 2008, p. 257). The 
Committee expressed concern over the guardianship system, especially with 
regards to issues including marriage and divorce, child custody, and individual 
choices on education, residency, and employment (Amnesty International, 
2009, p. 279). Additionally, it noted a high occurrence of domestic violence, 
and a lack of prosecution of abusers. The Saudi government responded that it 
was drafting a law against domestic violence (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 
279). Despite that law being approved in 2013, it never came to force because 
of a lack of enforcement of relevant institutions. 
In 2008, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women was 
invited by Saudi Arabia to investigate the subject. She noted progress in 
women’s access to education but said she had received many complaints 
about discrimination and violence against women, including by the religious 
police (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 279). In her report, she signalled that 
women were often unable to escape abusive environments due to their lack of 
autonomy and economic independence, and stated that the “high level of 
discrimination against women compromised their rights and dignity” (Amnesty 
International, 2010, p. 277).  
By inviting the Special Rapporteur on violence against women and 
submitting a report to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Karen van der Ploeg 
 20 
against Women, Saudi Arabia signalled it does want to participate in the 
institutions of the UN and the treaties the state has signed. However, reports 
were made with delay and the invitation of the Special Rapporteur also was 
postponed for some time.  
Unfortunately, both the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women and the Special Rapporteur on violence against women lack 
the enforcement mechanisms to hold Saudi Arabia to its promises. Both the 
Committee and the Special Rapporteur made important recommendations for 
improving the women’s rights situation, however, even though Saudi Arabia 
made some promises regarding these recommendations, they were never 
implemented. There have not been any repercussions for neglecting the 
propositions for improvement by the UN institutions for Saudi Arabia, and as a 
result, there is nothing much happening regarding these recommendations. 
Pressures from Below 
The Saudi government founded the National Human Rights Commission 
in 2005. Over the years, the institution sometimes appears in the reports, for 
example in 2008 when it urged the government to take measures to stop child 
marriage and announced the opening of a women’s branch to investigate 
abuses against women and children (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 279). 
However, the Commission does not have a large effect (yet), as the 
government oftentimes bluntly ignores the advice given by the institution it 
founded. The Commission often lacks the enforcement mechanisms to 
implement laws and recommendations regarding human rights. 
Interestingly, the influence of the press is visible. In the case of child 
marriage and domestic violence, attention by national media has in some 
cases truly made a difference. Examples include a 12-year-old girl being able 
to divorce her 80-year-old husband, and the case of a television presenter who 
was abused by her husband, who sparked a huge national debate on domestic 
violence. However, for national legislation the consequences are somewhat 
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smaller. Even though the government did move to make some amendments 
and positive changes on subjects that caused uproar through the national 
press, including an awareness-raising campaign on violence against women, 
the results of those new laws are not always existential. Additionally, the press 
is highly restricted in topics they are allowed to write about. Oftentimes 
journalists are arrested for posting stories that did not agree with the 
government.  
Local human rights activists also sought to make a difference, but were 
often harassed and intimidated by local authorities. Criticism on the 
government can, as was the case with Raif Badawi, lead to brutal sentences. 
The activists behind the ‘Women2Drive’ campaign who got behind the wheel 
were in some cases ignored, but others were sentenced to lashes, travel bans 
or prison sentences. Not only do these punishments discourage people from 
voicing their opinion, it also silences the ones that are brave enough to stand 
up for their rights. As a result, activists fail to make a true difference on 
governmental policies. 
Additionally, human rights organisations also have not had a large 
influence. The Saudi Arabian government has not allowed any observers by 
Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch access to the country in any 
year since 2000. As a result, these organisations have to rely on information 
provided by the government and local human rights activists. As a result, no 
independent research on the human rights situation has been possible, apart 
from the research done by the Special Rapporteur in 2008. Additionally, 
transnational networks are difficult to create. Because of the likeliness of being 
arrested when voicing opinions going against the government, it is dangerous 
for people to publicly come together for a cause that disagrees with the 
government, let alone found an organisation or tie oneself to such an 
organisation. With international human rights organisations not being allowed 
access to the country, local activists stand alone in their quest for human rights. 
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Social Mechanisms 
Looking at the human rights situation in Saudi Arabia from 2000 until 
2015, even though some positive developments have occurred, not a lot has 
changed for women. Unfortunately, both actors from below and above have not 
been able to bring about change. Looking back at the spiral model and its 
social mechanisms, several factors are of importance in this case. 
Firstly, as was seen with the ‘actors from above’, not many of the social 
mechanisms were used to push Saudi Arabia to compliance of CEDAW. 
Apparently, Saudi Arabia is in such a strong material position that other states 
refrain from interfering in the abominable situation of women in the state, and 
instead choose to focus on retaining and improving the economic relation they 
have with Saudi Arabia. The lack of the use of social mechanisms in the case of 
Saudi Arabia can mostly be explained because of its strong economic stance 
due to its oil export. As a result, states are cautious with criticism. Apparently, 
material vulnerability as a scope condition in the spiral model can be such a 
strong scope condition that it has an effect not only on the use of the type of 
social mechanism, but also on the use of any mechanism. 
Another explanation of the lack of social mechanisms being used, as 
was stated before, is the fact that the United States is seen as Saudi Arabia’s 
key partner. Since the United States itself has not ratified the Women’s 
Convention, it will most likely not criticize Saudi Arabia for its non-compliance 
with the Convention. Additionally, states in the region are not known for their 
good condition of women’s rights, resulting in them not being likely to criticize 
Saudi Arabia as well. On top of that has the Gulf Cooperation Council created a 
resolution criminalizing any criticism in the domestic situation by other member 
states, resulting in no criticism of Saudi Arabia’s women’s rights situation by 
those member states. Aside from being such an important business partner 
that states refrain from criticizing the human rights situation, Saudi Arabia thus 
has key partners and neighbouring states that are not in the position to criticize 
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because of their own lack of compliance with women’s rights norms or lack of 
ratification of the Women’s Convention. 
When legal measures were used through the UN Commission of the 
Women’s Convention and the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, 
making Saudi Arabia submit reports and visiting the country to assess the 
situation, the measures fail to bring about change. Even though both the UN 
Commission and the Special Rapporteur noted important issues and 
recommendations for improvement, there were no mechanisms in place to 
make Saudi Arabia commit to the promises it made, or to make Saudi Arabia 
implement those recommendations. In the case of the UN Commission of 
CEDAW, Saudi Arabia promised to implement a law criminalizing domestic 
violence, however, this law was never implemented. No mechanisms are in 
place to enforce the realization of promises and implementation of 
recommendations. 
Actors from below also suffered from the scope conditions of Saudi 
Arabia as identified with the spiral model. Because Saudi Arabia is an 
autocratic and such a repressive state, domestic actors are not powerful 
enough to stand up to their government. Local activists were often met with 
harassment or were arrested for voicing their opinion. With international human 
rights organisations not allowed access to the country, no large human rights 
networks could develop. Even though stories in the press sometimes did have 
an effect – mostly on sparking a discussion on human rights or resolving single 
cases of human rights violations –there is no press freedom, and as a result no 
true change could be brought about.  
In conclusion, Saudi Arabia thus possesses certain characteristics 
making the use of social mechanisms to push the state to compliance nearly 
impossible or at least highly unlikely. The scope conditions identified by Risse 
and Ropp (2013, p. 17-20) signalled some of the difficulties actors might have 
in using the social mechanisms, however, the enormous impact of the 
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combinations of characteristics Saudi Arabia possesses did not truly come 
forward. Saudi Arabia’s material strength, its autocratic system, and the 
combination of states in the region and its key partners result in leaving almost 
no room for actors from above and from below to demand change from the 
Saudi Arabian government.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis sought to answer the question: how to make states implement 
norms as they were intended upon the creation of a treaty? It used Saudi 
Arabia and the Convention on the Elimination of all Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) as a case study for this research. Looking at the social 
mechanisms described by the spiral model (Risse, Ropp & Sikkink, 2013) with 
regards to the provided scope mechanisms, it was expected that, firstly, the 
more social mechanisms are used that are in line with Saudi Arabia’s scope 
conditions, the more Saudi Arabia will be pushed into compliance. Secondly, 
taking Krook and True’s (2010) criticism on norm interpretations into account, it 
was expected that actors with a similar norm interpretation of CEDAW as Saudi 
Arabia have a bigger effect on pushing Saudi Arabia to compliance than would 
actors with different norm interpretations.  
Looking at the results, it has become clear that in de case of Saudi 
Arabia, social mechanisms were not often used.  The scope conditions that 
were identified by Risse and Ropp (2013) are highly likely to be the cause in 
this situation. Saudi Arabia’s autocratic system, material strength, and 
combination of key partners and states in the region altogether result in a 
situation where interference of both actors from above and actors from below is 
highly unlikely. Reflecting on the first hypothesis, it has thus been the case that 
Saudi Arabia’s scope conditions affected the use of social mechanisms by 
other actors. However, it has affected the use of social mechanisms in such a 
way that they were barely used at all. With regards to the second hypothesis on 
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norm interpretations, the results in this thesis are not able validate the 
hypothesis. Unfortunately, no social mechanisms were used by state actors 
with a similar norm interpretation to push Saudi Arabia to compliance of 
CEDAW. As a result, no conclusion on the effectiveness of criticism by actors 
with similar norm interpretation can be made. Logically one could argue that 
states with similar norm interpretations might only criticize when there is a true 
deviation from their norm, perhaps this was not the case with Saudi Arabia. 
However, this is a proposition to be tested in further research. 
In conclusion, Saudi Arabia thus possesses certain characteristics that 
make the use of social mechanisms to make it comply to CEDAW highly 
unlikely. As a result, in the current situation, actors from above and from below 
are not in the position to make the government adhere to women’s rights norms 
as they were intended in CEDAW. The biggest problem in the case of Saudi 
Arabia is its material strength, making states unwilling to criticize the state. 
Additionally, whenever Saudi Arabia did cooperate with legal measures 
through the UN, the involved institutions did not possess the capacity to 
enforce change. Both the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women 
and the Committee of CEDAW made recommendations on the situation in the 
state, but no mechanisms are in place to enforce the implementation of those 
recommendations.  
This thesis does have its limitations, as the reports used for this research 
did not always provide the in-depth information on interactions between states 
and international organisations that was looked for. Especially in the case of 
inter-state communication, information was not always available. Further 
research could go into researching how to get states with ‘difficult 
characteristics’ such as Saudi Arabia to comply. The issue of norm 
interpretation could be further investigated, as was touched upon before. 
Moreover, types of mechanisms to be used on materially strong states should 
be researched, in order to find how those states could also be pushed to 
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compliance. Lastly, research could focus on how to enforce UN institutions with 
mechanisms to make states implement recommendations provided by those 
institutions. Answering these questions will help improve the human rights 
situation in Saudi Arabia, as with the right measures, actors from above and 
below can succeed in pushing Saudi Arabia to improve the situation for women 
in the state and comply with CEDAW. 
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